KIEV AND THE MONTREUX CONVENTION:
THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER THAT BECAME

A CRUISER TO SQUEEZE THROUGH
THE TURKISH STRAITS

"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful
tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor
less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean
so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be masterthat's all."'
On July 18, 1976, the 40,000-ton Soviet naval vessel Kiev, sporting
a 600-foot flight deck 2 and a complement of helicopters and fixedwing aircraft,3 steamed into the Mediterranean after completing its
transit of the Turkish Straits. 4 The Montreux Convention, which
governs transit of the Turkish Straits, limits the aggregate tonnage
of all foreign naval forces in transit through the Straits to 15,000
tons. 5 Only in the case of capital ships6 does it allow Black Sea
powers to exceed this limit. 7 Although the Convention's definition
of capital ships includes cruisers, it specifically excludes aircraft
carriers.8
Nevertheless, Istanbul's military port authorities ac-

1. L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOxING-GLAsS 94 (Random House spec.
ed. 1946).
2. JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS 1975-76, at 551 (J. Moore ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as JANE's].
3. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Aug. 2, 1976, at 14.
4. N.Y. Times, July 19, 1976, at 4, col. 4.
5. Convention Regarding the R~gime of the Straits, with Annexes and
Protocol, July 20, 1936, art. 14, 173 L.N.T.S. 213, 222-23 [hereinafter cited
as Montreux Convention].
6. Battleships and cruisers are examples of capital ships.
7. Montreux Convention, supra note 5, art. 11.
8. Id. annex IT, pt. B (1). See text accompanying note 113 infra.
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cepted the Soviet classification of "antisubmarine cruiser" and
allowed the Kiev to pass.9
Did the Kiev's transit violate the Convention? In attempting to
answer that question, this Comment will first focus upon the
Turkish Straits in their historical perspective. It will then review
the Montreux Convention and its relevant provisions, measuring
the Kiev and its transit against the standards established by those
provisions. Finally, it will assess the future of the Montreux Convention and the prospects for its revision.
THE rMPORTANCE OF THE TURKISH STRAITS

The Turkish Straits include the Bosporus, the Sea of Marmara,
and the Dardanelles."0 The river-like Bosporus, to the northeast,
is about eighteen miles long and varies in width from about 800
yards to two and three-quarters miles at the Black Sea entrance.
The Dardanelles, to the southwest, are about forty-seven miles long
and average three to four miles in width. The Sea of Marmara
lies between."
The Straits, wholly within the territory of
Turkey, form a vital avenue of commerce between the landlocked
Black Sea and the Aegean Sea, which opens into the Mediterranean. 12 The struggle for control of these straits is as old as ancient
Greece and has constituted one of the major themes of diplomatic
history and international law.13
The Straits are important both economically and strategicallyeconomically as an avenue of maritime commerce between Black
Sea nations and the rest of the world, strategically as a checkpoint
against ingress to or egress from the Black Sea. 4 The factor
which brings them to the fore of world politics is the geographic

9. Washington Post, July 19, 1976, § A, at 16, col. 1.
10. These areas were known to the ancients as the Bosphorus, the Propontis, and the Hellespont. F. Vkx, THE TuRKisH STRAITS AND NATO 3-4
(1972) [hereinafter cited as VAri, STRAITS].
11. See Figure 1, taken from MAJOR MIDDLE EASTERN PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 67 (M.Khadduri ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MIDDLE
EASTERN PROBLEMS]. Istanbul (formerly Constantinople), a city of over two
million inhabitants, lies at the junction of the Bosporus and the Sea of
Marmara.
12. Id. at 67.
13. Id. at 65. For the history of the Straits from antiquity to 1940,
see J.SHOTWELL & F. DEA:, TURKEY AT THE STATS (1940).
14. MIDDLE EASTERN PROBLEMS, supranote 11, at 65-66.
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position of the Soviet Union, for which the Straits constitute a vital
economic and military artery.' 5 Although the Soviet Union has
busy ports on all coasts, the busiest are those on the Black Sea. 16
The persistent struggle by the Tsars and their successors for egress
to the Mediterranean 17 has closely intertwined the history of the
Straits with that of Russia and the Soviet Union.' 8 With the rise
of the Soviet Union as a world naval power, its maintenance of
a major fleet of warships in the Black Sea, and its extensive shipbuilding efforts in Black Sea ports, access to the Straits has again
become a strategic question of prime importance.
While the Straits are important to the Soviet Union, they are
far more important to Turkey because they constitute the major
factor of Turkish national interest, sovereignty, and security.19
Their narrow passage is well adapted for defense. Even the most
powerful navies and the strongest armies have failed to penetrate or
to occupy them.20 For five centuries Turkey has based its national
existence and security on the Straits. 21 Of necessity, questions
concerning the use of the Straits are of supreme importance to
Turkey.
The Straits are also important to the other Black Sea nations,
Romania and Bulgaria, and to many countries which trade with
the Black Sea nations or whose merchant ships carry cargo through
the Straits. 22 The United States' interest in the Straits has
evolved from primarily an economic one at the time of the
Montreux Conference to a strategic one today. 28
15. Bilsel, The Turkish Straits in the Light of Recent Turkish-Soviet Russian Correspondence,41 AM. J. INT'L L. 727, 731 (1947).
16. Id. Only the Black Sea ports remain ice-free the year around.
17. Id. at 732; Gorshkov, Navies in War and in Peace (pt. 3), U.S. NAVAL
INST. PROC., Mar. 1974, at 51, 54-55.

18. Bilsel, International Law in Turkey, 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 546, 556
(1944). On Russian attempts to gain access through the Straits, see Gorsh-

kov, Navies in War and in Peace (pt. 2), U.S.

NAVAL INST.

PRoc., Feb. 1974,

at 27.
19. Bilsel, Straits, supra note 15, at 732.
20. Id. at 731. After losing four battleships, the British Navy in 1915
gave up its attempt to run the Straits. In 1916, a half-million allied soldiers
failed to penetrate the Straits. VALI, STRAITS, supra note 10, at 9.

21. Bilsel, Straits, supranote 15, at 732.
22. The chief Romanian delegate at Montreux described the Straits as
"the very lungs of Roumania." Id. at 733. Richard Washburn Child,
American Chief Observer at Lausanne, voiced the interests of non-signatories in the Straits: "This discussion involves freedom of all those nations
outside the Straits who desire to reach them on their friendly errands ....
We cannot accept the position that the future of commerce in the Black
Sea is the exclusive affair of the states bordering upon it." Quoted in Bilsel,
InternationalLaw, supra note 18, at 551.
23. Letter from the Ambassador in Turkey to the Secretary of State (Apr.
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THE REGIMVE OF THE STRAITS
The Law of InternationalStraits
The right of free passage through international straits stems
from State practice hardening into customary international law and
thence into treaty law. 24 By the beginning of World War I, the

customary law had developed to the point that "the right of passage of merchant vessels in international straits was certain, and
warships were supposed to have the same right-though not with
26
25
In 1947, the Corfu Channel Case
the same degree of certainty."
firmly established that right for warships:
It is ... generally recognized and in accordance with international
custom that States in time of peace have a right to send their warships through straits used for international navigation between two
parts of the high seas without the previous authorization of a
coastal State, provided that the passage is innocent. Unless otherwise prescribed in an internationalconvention, there is no right for
State to prohibit such passage through straits in time of
a coastal
27
peace.
23, 1936) reprintedin [1936] 3 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 512, 513 (1953):
The Government of the United States has, as I understand the
matter, no treaty right, direct or indirect, with respect to the Straits
Convention; nor has it any concern with the military and political
aspects of that Convention; its sole practical interest in the matter
is the maintenance (or perhaps the amelioration) of the r6gime of
freedom of commercial navigation through the Straits.
Very probably, the decline of the American merchant fleet and the dramatic
rise of the Soviet Navy account for this shift of interest.
24. R. BAXTER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS 168 (1964) [hereinafter cited as BAXTER]. On the right of passage through international
straits, see Cundick, International Straits: The Right of Access, 5 GA. J.
INT'L & COmP. L. 107 (1975); Deddish, The Right of Passage by Warships
Through International Straits, 24 JAG J. 79 (1970); Grandison & Meyer,
International Straits, Global Communications, and the Evolving Law of
the Sea, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNT'L L. 393 (1975); McNees, Freedom of Transit
Through InternationalStraits, 6 J.MARITIME L. 175 (1975); Smith, Politics
of Lawmaking: Problems in International Maritime Regulation-Innocent
Passage v. Free Transit, 37 U. PITT. L. REv. 487 (1976); Note, Peacetime
Passage by Warships Through Territorial Straits, 50 COLUm. L. REV. 220
(1950); Comment, Free Transit in Territorial Straits: Jurisdiction on an
Even Keel?, 3 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 375 (1973); Comment, Passage Through
International Straits: Free or Innocent? The Interests at Stake, 11 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 815 (1974).

25. 1 E. BRiEL,

INTERNATIONAL STRAITS:

A

TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL

LAW 202 (1947).

26. The Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. 4.
27. Id. at 28 (emphasis deleted and added).

This exception pointed clearly to the Turkish Straits, which were
then governed by the Montreux Convention. 28 Thus, to the general
right of free passage of warships through international straits
enunciated in the Corfu Channel Case, an exception was made for
the Turkish Straits. 29 At this point the law was clear.
However, the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone obscured the matter by confounding the bodies
of law relating to the right of transit through international straits
and to the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.30
In a section dealing with innocent passage in the territorial sea,
the Convention declared a rule applicable to all ships: "There shall
be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through
straits which are used for international navigation between one part
of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial
sea of a foreign state." 3'
While this provision omits reference to
straits covered by international agreements, a later provision
exempting "conventions or other international agreements already
in force, as between States Parties to them," is generally understood
to except the Turkish Straits from its operation.3 2
If the law regarding transit of warships through the Turkish
Straits is inconsistent with that generally applicable to international straits, the difference is due to the special position of the
Black Sea, rather than to any internal inconsistency in the international law of straits. 33 Because considerations of history and
geography have combined to place the Turkish Straits in a position
which has no exact counterpart among the other waterways of the
world, the law of the Straits cannot be found in the general law
applicable to other international waterways. Rather, it must be
28. BAXTER, supra note 24, at 164 n.77; McNees, Freedom of Transit, supra
note 24, at 200 n.111.
29. BAXTER, supra note 24, at 165.
30. See id. at 166-67.
31. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 16, para. 4, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516
U.N.T.S. 205.
32. Id. art. 25. See Johnson, Some Legal Problems of InternationalWaterways, with ParticularReference to the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal,
31 MODERN L. RaV. 153, 158 (1968). Cf. United Nations Third Conference
on the Law of the Sea Revised Single Negotiating Text, which provides
under Part II, Chapter II, entitled Straits used for internationalnavigation:
Nothing in this Chapter shall affect:
(c) The legal r4gime in straits in which passage is regulated
in whole or in part by long-standing international conventions in
force specifically relating to such straits.
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 8/Rev. 1/Pt. II, art. 34, at 22 (1976).
33. BAXTER, supra note 24, at 166.
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sought in those specific customs and agreements which have grown
out of the historic use and control of this unique waterway.

4

The Historic Regime of the Turkish Straits
For three hundred years following the Turkish consolidation of
control over the Balkans and the Black Sea in the fifteenth century,
the Ottoman Porte prohibited passage of foreign ships through the
Straits.3 5 In 1774, Turkey recognized Russia as a Black Sea power
36
By the
and granted rights of passage for its merchant vessels.
time of the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1856, the principle
of free commercial navigation of the Turkish Straits had become
universal. 37 Except for the passage of Russian warships during
three emergency occasions between 1774 and 1840,38 the Straits
remained closed to warships until the Lausanne Treaty of 1923,
which adopted the principle of freedom of transit and of navigation
by sea and by air through the Straits, restricting warships only
as to numbers. 39 The Lausanne Treaty represented a radical departure from previous practice, yet by itself it could not alter
the centuries-old customary law prohibiting transit of warships
through the Straits. 40 By restating the principle of free transit
and navigation by sea through the Straits (although maintaining
34. See id. at 193.
35. MIDDLE EASTERN PROBLEMS, supra note 11, at 66. For a discussion of
early Ottoman practice, see 2 BRi-EL, supra note 25, at 252-72.
36. MIDDLE EASTERN PROBLEMS, supra note 11, at 66. For the text of the
Treaty of Kiichiik Kainarja, see 1 J. HuREwITz, DIPLOMACY IN THE NEAR AND
MIDDLE EAST 54-61 (1956). The Turkish Straits are mentioned in about
twenty conventions of historical importance between 1774 and 1921. Five
independent treaties deal solely with the Straits: London, 1841; Paris, 1856;
London, 1871; Lausanne, 1923; and Montreux, 1936. Bilsel, International
Law, supra note 18, at 550.
37. MIDDLE EASTERN PROBLEMS, supra note 11, at 66.

The treaty of Paris

demilitarized the Black Sea. On the treatment of Turkey at the Treaty of
Paris, see Wood, The Treaty of Paris and Turkey's Status in International
Law, 37 Am. J. INT'L L. 262 (1943).
38. F. VALI, BRIDGE AcRoss THE BosPoRus 183 (1971).
39. Convention Relating to the Regime of the Straits, July 24, 1923, 28
L.N.T.S. 115.
40. Compare Fenwick, The New Status of the Dardanelles, 30 Am . J.
INT'L L. 701, 702-03 (1936), with Baxter, Multilateral Treaties As Evidence
of Customary InternationalLaw, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 275 (1965-66), and
Jordan, Creation of Customary International Law by Way of Treaty, 9 A.F.
JAG L. REV. 38 (1967). Concerning custom as a source of international law,
see J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OP NATIONS 59-62 (6th ed. 1963).

certain restrictions on warships), the Montreux Convention of 1936
laid to rest this "ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire." In so doing,
not only did it establish treaty law among its signatories, but it
law of the Straits
also further solidified an emerging customary
41
which had its roots in the Lausanne Treaty.
The Montreux Convention
Early in 1936, Turkey called for a revision of the Lausanne Treaty
in order to terminate that treaty's onerous provisions demilitarizing
the Turkish Straits. 42 Fearing for its national security in the face
of the widespread rearmanent of Europe, Turkey desired to refortify the Straits 43 by seeking a revision of the Straits Regime at
a conference of the Lausanne Treaty signatories. 44 Only Italy
declined to participate.
The Montreux Conference met from June 22 to July 20, 1936, and
produced an agreement comprising twenty-nine articles, four
41. Cf. Jordan, supra note 40, at 53:

Treaties may change, modify, or simply restate existing rules of
customary international law. It is ... generally accepted that new
rules of customary international law may be inferred from the appearance of the same provisions in agreement after agreement,
whether bilateral or multilateral.

Examples of this law creating method may be found in treaties
on the use of systems of international waters ....
42. Note, The Straits Convention of Montreux, 1936, 18 BraIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 186, 187 (1937). In return for the demilitarization, "the high contracting
parties, with special reference to France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and
Japan, guaranteed Turkey against attack on the Straits." Id. For developments leading to the Montreux Convention, see A. TOYNBEE, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1936, at 584-641 (1937).

For U.S. diplomatic corre-

spondence concerning these developments, see [1934] 2 FoREIGN REL. U.S.
971-90 (1951); [1935] 1 FoRmGN REL. U.S. 1026-42 (1953); [1936] 3 FonEIGN
REL. U.S. 503-29 (1953).
43. See Letter from the Ambassador in Turkey to the Secretary of State
(July 3, 1935), reprinted in [1935] 1 FoREIGN REL. U.S. 1034 (1953); Note
from the Turkish Government to the Parties to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923
(Apr. 10, 1936), reprintedin [1936] 3 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 503 (1953); Letter
from the Ambassador in Turkey to the Secretary of State (Apr. 14, 1936),
id. at 506, 508-09; Letter from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom to
the Secretary of State (Apr. 20, 1936), id. at 511; Memorandum by the
American Ambassador of a Conversation with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Apr. 22, 1936), id. at 514, 517.
44. Commentators have commended the Turkish government for seeking
revision of the Lausanne regime rather than unilaterally denouncing it.
Bilsel, International Law, supra note 18, at 546, 549; Fenwick, supra note
40, at 701, 703; Memorandum, supra note 43, at 517. But see Letter from
the Ambassador in Turkey (Apr. 14, 1936), supra note 43, at 509, suggesting
a moderating British influence. Parties to the Lausanne Treaty included
the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Soviet
Russia, Yugoslavia, and Turkey.
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annexes, and one protocol. 45 This agreement reaffirmed the prin46
ciple of freedom of transit and navigation of the Straits by sea,
47
providing that the principle shall continue without limit of time.
The agreement limited application of specific provisions, however,
to twenty years or until two years after notice of denunciation has
been given by a High Contracting Party, whichever period proved
48
longer.
The Convention substantially repeated the 1923 provisions regarding merchant shipping, but at the urging of the Soviet Union,
it altered provisions regulating transit of warships. Still an outlaw
among nations in 1923, the Soviet Union employed its newly gained
status and respectability as a member of the League of Nations,
an ally of Republican France, and a growing military power to bargain at Montreux for greater restrictions on entry of foreign warships into the Black Sea. 49 However, the resulting terms represented a compromise between the Soviet position of excluding all
foreign warships and the British and Japanese positions favoring
50
equal transit rights for warships of all nations.
45. The Convention includes five sections: Section I, Merchant Vessels
(arts. 2-7); Section II, Vessels of War (arts. 8-22); Section III, [Civil] Aircraft (art. 23); Section IV, General Provisions (arts. 24 & 25); and Section
V, Final Provisions (arts. 26-29). The General Provisions designate the
Turkish government as the supervising authority for the R6gime of the
Straits and provide that nothing in the Convention shall prejudice the rights
and obligations of the Parties, members of the League of Nations, arising
out of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Final Provisions deal
with ratification, accession, duration, amendment, denunciation, and revision.
The English text quoted herein was translated by His Britannic Majesty's
Foreign Office from the French Official Text registered with the League
of Nations on December 11, 1936.
For a review of the major issues discussed at the Convention and the
views of the parties regarding them, see Royal Institute of International
Affairs, Montreux Straits Convention, 1936 (Aug. 1936) (on file in the office
of the San Diego Law Review).
46. Montreux Convention, supra note 5, art. 1.
47. Id. art. 28.
48. Id.
49. See Memorandum, supra note 43, at 516; Fenwick supra note 40, at
703, 705-06. See also Letter from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union to
the Secretary of State (Apr. 24, 1936), reprinted in [1936] 3 FOREIGN REL.
U.S. 518 (1953).
50. Memorandum, supra note 43, at 516; Telegram from the Consul at
Geneva to the Secretary of State (June 26, 1936), reprinted in [1936] 3
FOREIGN REL. U.S. 524 (1953); cf. Telegram from the Consul at Geneva to

The articles governing transit of warships allow free transit
during peacetime 51 for light surface vessels,5 2 minor war vessels,5 3 and auxiliary vessels 54 of both Black Sea and non-Black
Sea powers 55 up to an aggregate of 15,000 tons or nine vessels

in transit at any one time. 56 Each transit must be preceded by
diplomatic notification to the Turkish government,51 commenced
the Secretary of State (June 23, 1936), id. at 522: "[T]he real problem of
the Conference is seen to lie in an adjustment of the British and Russian
positions."

51. In time of war, if Turkey is not belligerent, warships enjoy the same
freedom of transit as during peacetime. Warships of belligerent powers,
however, are prohibited from transiting except to render assistance pursuant to a mutual assistance pact binding on Turkey or to return to base after
being separated therefrom. Montreux Convention, supra note 5, art. 19.
In time of war, if Turkey is a belligerent, passage of warships is left entirely to the discretion of the Turkish government. Id. art. 20. The same
discretionary power applies when Turkey considers itself threatened with
danger of war. Id. art. 21.
52. Light Surface Vessels are surface vessels of war other than aircraft-carriers, minor war vessels or auxiliary vessels, the standard
displacement of which exceeds 100 tons (102 metric tons) and does
not exceed 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons), and which do not carry
a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 in. (203 mm.).
Id. annex II, pt. B (3).
53. Minor War Vessels are surface vessels of war, other than auxiliary vessels, the standard displacement of which exceeds 100 tons
(102 metric tons) and does not exceed 2,000 tons (2,032 metric
tons), provided they have none of the following characteristics:
(a) Mount a gun with a calibre exceeding 6.1 in (155 mm.);
(b) Are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes;
(c) Are designed for a speed greater than twenty knots.
Id. annex II, pt. B (5).
54. Auxiliary Vessels are naval surface vessels the standard displacement of which exceeds 100 tons (102 metric tons), which are normally employed on fleet duties or as troop transports, or in some
other way than as fighting ships, and which are not specifically
built as fighting ships, provided they have none of the following
characteristics:
(a) Mount a gun with a calibre exceeding 6.1 in. (155 mm.);
(b) Mount more than eight guns with a calibre exceeding 3 in.
(76 mm.);
(c) Are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes;
(d) Are designed for protection by armour plate;
(e) Are designed for a speed greater than twenty-eight knots;
(f) Are designed or adapted primarily for operating aircraft at
sea;
(g) Mount more than two aircraft-launching apparatus.
Id. annex II, pt. B (6).
55. Id. art. 10.
56. Id. art. 14. Auxiliaries which are "specifically designed for the carriage of fuel, liquid or non-liquid" and which carry less than a specified
armament are not counted, provided they pass singly. Id. art. 9. The
10,000-ton limit for light surface vessels provides the upper limit on the
displacement of any single warship in transit. Compare id. annex II, pt.
B(3), with id. art. 14.
57. The Convention requires eight days notice from Black Sea powers
and fifteen days notice from non-Black Sea powers. "The notification shall
specify the destination, name, type and number of the vessels,. .. the date
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59
Warships in transit
in daylight, 58 and effected expeditiously.
may under no circumstances operate any aircraft they are carrying.60
Consonant with the restrictions it places on warships of foreign
powers,"' the Convention accords certain privileges to Black Sea
powers. The most important allows Black Sea powers to exceed
62
provided
the 15,000-ton limitation in the case of capital ships,
63
destroyers.
two
than
more
they pass singly, escorted by not
Another establishes a limited right of transit for submarines be64
longing to Black Sea powers.

Article 8 provides that definitions relating to war vessels and
their specifications and to calculation of tonnages shall be as set
forth in Annex H.115 At the outset, Annex II defines standard
displacement 6 and ton. 67 Then it lists and describes in detail six
of entry for the outward passage and, if necessary, for the return journey."
Id. art. 13.
58. Id. art. 10.
59. Id. art. 16.
60. Id. art. 15 (quoted in note 114 and accompanying text infra).
61. The aggregate tonnage of foreign warships allowed in the Black Sea
is set at 30,000 tons but may rise proportionately with an increase in the
size of the strongest Black Sea fleet to a maximum of 45,000 tons, if that
fleet first increases by at least 10,000 tons. Further, no foreign warship may
remain in the Black Sea longer than 21 days. Id. art. 18.
62. Id. art. 11. For the definition of capital ships, see text accompanying
note 113 infra.
63. Montreux Convention, supra note 5, art. 11.
64. Submarines purchased or constructed outside the Black Sea may
transit to join their bases in the Black Sea; those stationed in the Black
Sea may transit for repairs at a base outside the Black Sea. In either case
adequate notice must be given to Turkey, and each submarine must travel
singly, by day, and on the surface. Id. art. 12.
A privilege accorded solely to Turkey, but which may be exercised in
favor of any nation, allows a naval force of any tonnage or composition
to pay a courtesy visit of limited duration to a port in the Straits at the
invitation of the Turkish government. Any such force, however, must leave
the Straits by the same route as that by which it entered, unless it otherwise
fulfills the conditions required for transit through the Straits. Id. art. 17.
65. The wording of Annex II was taken from the London Naval Treaty
of March 25, 1936, 50 Stat. 1363, T.S. No. 919, 184 L.N.T.S. 115.
66. Annex II defines separately the standard displacement of surface vessels and submarines. Only that of surface vessels is relevant here.
The standard displacement of a surface vessel is the displacement of the vessel, complete, fully manned, engined, and equipped
ready for sea, including all armament and ammunition, equipment,
outfit, provisions and fresh water for crew, miscellaneous stores
and implements of every description that are intended to be carried
in war, but without fuel or reserve feed water on board.
67. The word ton except in the expression metric ton denotes the ton
of 2,240 lb. (1,016 kilos).

categories of warships: capital ships,68 aircraft carriers, 9 light
surface vessels, 70 submarines, 7 1 minor war vessels, 7 2 and auxili3

ary vessels.7

The Convention concludes with a protocol allowing Turkey to
"immediately remilitarise the zone of the Straits" and to provisionally apply the regime specified in the Convention commencing on
August 15, 1936. The Protocol became effective upon the signing
of the Convention on July 20, 1936. The following day, Turkish
74
troops reoccupied the Straits.

Contemporary commentators differed regarding the effect of the
Convention. One saw great legal and political significance in the
Convention's removal of the servitude imposed by the Treaty of
Paris with respect to Russian armed vessels in the Black Sea and
in its freeing Russia to send its warships into the Aegean practically without restriction, while at the same time restricting the
rights of non-Black Sea powers to send their warships into the
Black Sea. He viewed the resulting situation as marking a new
era in the relations of the successor governments to the old Muscovite and Ottoman empires. To him, the political significance of
the treaty far exceeded its legal significance. 75
Another commentator saw more restrictions but no material
alteration from the Lausanne regime. He contended that contrary
to suggestions that the Montreux Convention altered the balance
of power in the Mediterranean, only the details had changed. Furthermore, he saw a new and severe restriction on all powers:
Passage in wartime, if Turkey was not a belligerent, was forbidden
entirely to all belligerents except in the case of action under the
League of Nations Covenant or against an aggressor under a mutual
68. See text accompanying note 113 infra.

69. See text accompanying note 81 infra.
70. See note 52 supra.
71. Submarines are all vessels designed to operate below the surface of
the sea.
72. See note 53 supra.
73. See note 54 supra. Annex II also sets forth criteria for determining
if a given vessel is "over-age." Of the remaining Annexes, Annex I sets
forth taxes and charges on merchant vessels; Annex III deals with three
over-age Japanese training ships; and Annex IV establishes the method of
calculating the strength of Black Sea fleets under Article 18.
74. See Telegram No. 36 from the Ambassador in Turkey to the Secretary
of State (July 22, 1936), reprinted in [1936] 3 FoREiGN REL. U.S. 526
(1953). See also the exchange of telegrams between the Secretary of State
and the Ambassador in Turkey (Apr. 20 &21, 1936), id. at 510, 512.
75. Fenwick, supra note 40, at 705-06.
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assistance pact to which Turkey was a party.76
Although the Montreux regime again came to the political fore
at the end of World War II when Stalin attempted to gain a foothold in the Straits,7 the Convention has yet to be amended,
revised, or denounced by the parties. Thus, the 1936 Montreux
Convention supplied the entire law in effect at the time Kiev
transited the Turkish Straits.
QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE Kiev's

TRANSIT

Did the Kiev's Transit Violate the Montreux Convention?
Opinions are divided on this question. The parties to the Convention who have expressed their views publicly say that no violation
occurred, 78 while many Western observers believe a violation did
occur. 79 One of these observers, Captain John E. Moore (Royal
76. Note, supra note 42, at 188. But see Memorandum by the American
Ambassador of a Conversation with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs
(July 25, 1936), reprinted in [1936] 3 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 527 (1953):
[A mutual assistance treaty] was altogether out of the question,
as Turkey has no present or imaginable intention to become a party
to such a treaty; so the proviso was based on a condition contrary
to fact and therefore meaningless save as it was acceptable to the
French and Soviet Governments because enabling them to make
it appear to their home constituencies that the Conference had
given them some additional element of security.
77. On Soviet attempts to seize the Straits, see VALI, STRAITS, supra note
10, at 58-81. For texts of the ensuing diplomatic correspondence, see id.
at 224-97; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 2752, THE PROBLEM OF THE TURKISH
See also Bilsel, Straits, supra note 15, at 739-47:
STRAITS 47-68 (1947).
Xydis, New Light on the Big Three Crisis over Turkey in 1945, 14 MIDDLE
EAST J. 416 (1960).
For Turkish-American relations after World War II,
see G. KEENAN, MEMOIRS, 1925-1950, at 313-24 (1967); G. KIRK, SURVEY OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: THE MIDDLE EAST, 1945-1950, at 21-56 (1954); 2 H.
TRUMAN, MEMOIRS

96-109 (1956).

78. In response to the author's inquiries, the governments of Greece, Australia, Turkey, and Great Britain indicated that they have made no official
statements on the matter. But see the remarks of Lord Goronwy-Roberts,
British Minister of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in the
House of Lords:
What is regrettable is that notification was made in terms of a vessel described as a cruiser but which is clearly more describable as
an aircraft carrier. We take the view that, under the Montreux
Convention, an aircraft carrier is not in the class of vehicles which
ought to be allowed transit. It would seem to us-and I hope that
I am wrong-to have circumvented the spirit, if not the terms, of
the Convention.
373 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1039-40 (July 26, 1976).
79. The United States has not taken an official position concerning the
transit. For NATO's position, see Prina, Defense in Depth, SEA POWER, Sept.
1976, at 8, 11; NAVY TIMES, Aug. 23, 1976, at 26; The Times (London),

Navy, retired), editor of Jane's Fighting Ships and a respected
authority on world navies, asserts that the Kiev's transit "flagrantly breached" the Montreux Convention."0
Arriving at a logical, as opposed to a political, answer to this question requires reducing it to its factual and legal components. The
factual component involves whether the Kiev is an aircraft carrier;
the legal component inquires whether the Montreux Convention
prohibits transit of aircraft carriers. Affirmative answers to both
questions indicate that the Kiev's transit violated the Montreux
Convention. A negative answer to either shows that no violation
occurred.
The evidence available to aid in determining the first of these
issues includes the Kiev's designation, its appearance, and a comparison of its dimensions, armament, aircraft, and missions with
those of other similarly classified or similarly configured ships. The
standard against which this evidence must be compared is the
definition of aircraft carriers found in Annex II to the Convention,
for regardless of whether the Kiev looks like an aircraft carrier,
the important question is whether it is an aircraft carrier within
the meaning of the Montreux Convention:
Aircraft-Carriersare surface vessels of war, whatever their displacement, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of
carrying and operating aircraft at sea. The fitting of a landingon or flying-off deck on any vessel of war, provided such vessel
has not been designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of
carrying and operating aircraft at sea, shall not cause any vessel
so fitted to be classified in the category of aircraft-carriers.8 1

Thus, it appears that the determining factor as far as the Convention is concerned is whether the Kiev was "designed or adapted
primarily to carry and operate aircraft at sea."
Is the Kiev Designed Primarily to Carry and Operate Aircraft at
Sea?
In determining whether the Kiev is an aircraft carrier within the
meaning of the Montreux Convention, it is instructive to consider
June 5, 1976, at 1, col. 4; id. July 19, 1976, at 5, col. 1; Washington Post,
July 19, 1976, § A, at 16, col. 1.
80. Interview with Captain John E. Moore (Royal Navy, ret.) by Alan
Jarvis, Navy Times Associate Editor, in NAVY TimEs, Sept. 20, 1976, at 4.
81. Montreux Convention, supra note 5, annex II, pt. B (2). The French
official text reads:
Les bdtiments porte-adronefs sont des b~timents de guerre de
surface qui, quel que soit leur deplacement, sont congus ou amenages principalement pour transporter et mettre en action des
a6ronefs en mer. Si un b~timent de guerre n'a pas 6t6 congu ou
amenag6 principalement pour transporter et mettre en action des
a~ronefs en mer, l'installation sur ce bftiment d'un pont d'atterrissage ou d'envol n'aura pas pour effet de le faire entrer dans
la classe des bbtiments porte-a6ronefs.
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the opinions of knowledgeable observers, the similarities between
the Kiev's mission capabilities and those of Western aircraft carriers,
and the evolution of the Kiev's design.
What Observers Say About the Kiev
The Soviet Navy has designated the Kiev a Protivolodochny
Kreyser, meaning antisubmarine cruiser.8 2 Jane's calls this "an
interesting designation for a ship of this size, suggesting a bias
towards [antisubmarine warfare] .. .but more probably aimed at
circumventing the restrictions on aircraft carriers in the Montreux
Convention .. . ."83 Jane's classifies the Kiev as an aircraft
carrier.8 4 In March 1972, while the Kiev was being constructed,
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, then Chief of Naval Operations, told the
United States Congress that, according to reconnaissance satellite
85
photos, the ship "looks and feels like an aircraft carrier.
Admiral James L. Holloway, III, present Chief of Naval Operations,
more recently compared the Kiev's size to that of the United States
World War Ir Essex-class aircraft carriers.8 6 Shortly after the
Kiev's transit, Mr. Hattersby, British Minister of State for the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office in the House of Commons,
expressed little doubt that the Kiev meets the Convention's defini-

tion of aircraft carriers.8 7
The Kiev's Mission Capabilities
A Soviet Naval Captain of First Rank who is also a Candidate
of Juridical Science has deplored the recent attempts of some
foreign authors "to claim that antisubmarine cruisers built in the
U.S.S.R. are aircraft carriers, by attributing uncharacteristic func82. JANE'S, supra note 2, at 551.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 105 & 551. See Figures 2 & 3. Jane's, however. "classifies a ship
most similar to the KIEV, the INVINCIBLE, presently under construction
for the Royal Navy and possessing facilities for vertical take-off aircraft,
as an anti-submarine cruiser." Letter from Mr. Ugur Ziyal, First Secretary,
Turkish Embassy, to the author (Nov. 24, 1976) (on file in the office of

the San Diego Law Review).
85. Quoted in Polmar, The Soviet "Aircraft Carrier," U.S.

NAVAL

INST.

PROC., May 1974, at 144, 158 [hereinafter cited as Polmar, "Aircraft Carrier"].
86. Address by Admiral James L. Holloway, III, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Naval Institute Annual Meeting, in San Diego, Cal. (Apr. 15,
1976), reprinted in UNITED

STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE SPECIAL REPORT

5 (June

1976). See Figure 4. Twenty-three Essex-class aircraft carriers were built
to displace 36,380 tons at full load, with an overall length of either 888 or
972 feet and a width of 196 feet. JANE'S, supra note 2, at 436.
87. See note 108 infra.

Figure 2

Figure 3

Official U.S. Navy Photograph

Official U.S. Navy Photograph
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Figure 4

Official U.S. Navy Photograph

tions to them. '8 8 Because a warship's design and weaponry dictate
the missions it can perform, analysis of these features should yield
an objective assessment of its characteristic functions. Although
the Kiev carries a heavier armament than do its Western counterparts, the missions the Kiev and its aircraft are capable of performing closely resemble those performed by Western aircraft carriers.
89
In addition to its antisubmarine weapon systems, the Kiev car88. He deplores the "groundlessness" of these allegations and summarily
concludes without analysis: "As a thorough analysis of the Montreux Convention shows, one can consider from a legal point of view that passage
through the Straits by any ships of States on the Black Sea does not contradict the letter and spirit of the Convention." Serkov, Pravovoy rezhim
Chernomorskikh prolivov (The Legal Regime of the Black Sea Straits),
MORSKOY SBORNIK (NAVAL ANTHOLOGY), July 1976, at 83, 86.
89. Essentially the same as those of its forerunner, the Moskva, the Kiev's
antisubmarine weapons include two RBU-2500 A (or later) antisubmarine

ries a gun-missile armament the equal of any surface combatant
now afloat.20 This heavy offensive and defensive gun-missile armament differs from the United States' approach to carrier design and
indicates that the Kiev will probably operate in high-threat areas
where there is danger of carrier-based or land-based air attack.0 1
The Kiev's most important weapons, however, are its aircraft, a
mixture of some twenty-five Ka-25 "Hormone-A" helicopters 2
and twelve to fifteen Yak-36 VSTOL fighters.0 3 These aircraft prorocket launchers with a range of at least 5,500 yards, one twin-rail SUWN-1 antisubmarine missile launcher with a range of 16 to 20 nautical miles,
and probably two quintuple mounts of 21-inch torpedo tubes installed behind panels in the hull. Bow-mounted and variable depth sonars provide
target inputs for these weapons. Polmar, The Soviet Aircraft Carrier,U.S.
NAVAL INST. PROC., Oct. 1976, at 138-39 [hereinafter cited as Polmar, Aircraft Carrier];Polmar, "Aircraft Carrier," supra note 85, at 154, 159. For
additional information concerning Soviet antisubmarine weapons, see
Polmar, Thinking About Soviet ASW, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC., May 1976,
at 108.
90. The Kiev mounts forward and aft twin 76 mm. rapid-fire guns for
use against surface and air targets, forward and aft SA-N-3 twin-rail "Goblet" antiaircraft missile launchers, eight 23 mm. Gatling guns probably for
close-in antiship missile defense, eight SS-N-12-type cruise missile launchers for use against surface targets up to 550 miles distant, and two retractable SA-N-4 twin-rail short-range defensive missile launchers. In addition,
it carries a variety of radars to control the firing of these weapons. Polmar,
Aircraft Carrier, supra note 89, at 138-39; Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Aug.
2, 1976, at 17.
91. Polmar, Aircraft Carrier,supra note 89, at 139.
92. The Ka-25, designated "Hormone-A" by NATO, is a twin-rotor, turbine-powered craft fitted for submarine detection and attack. A few of the
"Hormone-B" type may be embarked, however, to provide long-range detection and targeting for the SS-N-12 antiship missiles which the Kiev carries. Id. at 140. See Figure 2 for an on-deck view of the Ka-25.
93. The Yakovlev-36 is a single seat VSTOL (vertical/short takeoff and
landing) fighter-type aircraft with two turbojet engines which exhaust
through vector-thrust nozzles for vertical flight. Fifty feet long, 17 feet
high, with a wingspan of 23 feet, the high subsonic Yak-36 is a second generation VSTOL aircraft developed from the "Freehand," displayed at the
Paris air show in 1967. The aircraft, which has two pylons for stores under
its inboard wing panels and two for electronic sensors outboard, is probably
capable of employing a variety of weapons including machine guns, bombs,
air-to-air missiles, and tactical air-to-surface missiles. It gives the Soviet
Navy its first sea-based airborne defense and strike capability. Compare
Polmar, Aircraft Carrier, supra note 89, at 139-40, with Soviet Navy
V/STOL Aircraft (information sheet supplied by Congressman Bob Wilson
on Oct. 27, 1976, on file in the office of the San Diego Law Review), and
Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Aug. 2, 1976, at 14. For a photograph of the
Yak-36 in take-off and landing configuration, see Figure 5. For additional
photographs, see Av. WEEK & SPACE TEcH., Aug. 16, 1976, at 20. The NATO

designation for the Kiev's VSTOL aircraft is "Forger." Statement of Rear
Admiral Donald P. Harvey, Director of Naval Intelligence, concerning the
Soviet Naval Threat, before the House Armed Services Comm. (Feb. 4,
1977), at 10, to be reprinted in Hearings Before the House Armed Services
Comm.,95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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vide the Kiev with increased flexibility to perform a variety of
defensive and offensive missions traditionally performed by Western aircraft carriers including fleet air defense, antisubmarine warfare, long-range reconnaissance, electronic intelligence gathering,
interception of subsonic aircraft, close air support, and attack on
surface targets-both at sea and ashore.9 4 Thus, antisubmarine
warfare appears to be but one of many missions the Kiev and its
aircraft can perform 5 Indeed, it is the Kiev's offensive powerprojection capability-a role traditionally associated with aircraft
carriers-not its defensive antisubmarine warfare role, that most
concerns Western observers. William Middendorf, Secretary of the
Navy, views the Kiev's tactical air support capabilities for projection of power ashore as an "ominous trend for the near future." 96
The Kiev's Design
The Kiev's size and design clearly indicate that it is intended to
function primarily as an aircraft carrier. Built at Nikolayev 97 in
the Black Sea, the Kiev is the largest warship ever completed in
the Soviet Union. 8 Nine hundred twenty-five feet long, 200 feet
wide, with an angled flight deck of 550 to 600 feet, it displaces some
40,000 tons 9 and carries a complement of at least twenty-five helicopters and twelve VSTOL fighters. 10 0
94. Compare Polmar, "Aircraft Carrier," supra note 85, at 160, with Soviet Navy V/STOL Aircraft, supra note 93, and Polmar, Aircraft Carrier,
supra note 89, at 140. Some observers have even suggested an amphibious
support capability. Interview, supra note 80; N.Y. Times, July 22, 1976, at
5, col. 1.
95. Polmar, Aircraft Carrier,supranote 89, at 140.
96. Quoted in Prina, supra note 79, at 11. For an excellent analysis of
the various roles the Kiev can perform, see Hynes, The Role of the Kiev
in Soviet Naval Operations, NAVAL WAR C. REV., fall 1976, at 38. Rear Admiral Harvey stresses "the combat capabilities of the individual units and
the ability of those units to fulfill their missions" as more important than
relative numbers of particular ship-types in calculating the naval balance.
Statement, supra note 93, at 2.
97. In Black Sea Shipyard No. 444, formerly the Nosenko Yard at Nikolayev, northeast of the Black Sea port of Odessa. Polmar, Aircraft Carrier,
supra note 89, at 141.
98. Initial Western press reports of its construction, based on "the latest
U.S. reconnaissance satellite photos," appeared in January 1972, and indicated a ship some 800 feet in length was being built. Polmar, "Aircraft
Carrier,"supra note 85, at 158.
99. JAN.'s, supranote 2, at 551.
100. Compare Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Aug. 2, 1976, at 14, with id., Aug.

Kiev's forerunners, two 15,000-ton, helicopter-carrying "antisubmarine cruisers," the Moskva and the Leningrad, were built in the
same shipyard at Nikolayev.' 0 1 Kiev's plans must already have
been on the drawing board when these ships were launched in 1967
and 1968,102 but its construction did not begin until 1969 or 1970,
at least a year after Moskva's initial six-month deployment in the
Kiev was launched in December 1972,104 and
Mediterranean.1 03
began sea trials in the Black Sea in 1975.105
Although the Kiev's cruiser-like superstructure resembles that of

its forerunners, its angled deck and great weight depart signifi9, 1976, at 26. Some observers estimate a larger aircraft-carrying capacityfrom 25 helicopters and 25 fixed-wing aircraft to 35 VSTOL aircraft and
30 to 35 helicopters. See, e.g., JANE'S, supra note 2, at 551; Polmar, "Aircraft Carrier," supra note 85, at 159. For additional photographs, see Kievlatest photos reval [sic] new Russian VISTOL airdraft [sic], 4 INT'L
DEFENSE REV. 537 (1976).
101. Polmar, Aircraft Carrier,supra note 89, at 141.
102. JANE's, supra note 2, at 551.
103. Polmar, "Aircraft Carrier," supra note 85, at 158. Because the
Moskva and the Leningrad were designed primarily for the purpose of operating helicopters at sea, their compatibility with the terms of the Convention could be supported by two arguments: either helicopters are not "aircraft" within the meaning of the Convention, or the helicopter is a technological development not contemplated by the drafters and therefore not
covered by the Convention. Because the Convention does not define aircraft, these contentions may resolve to the same argument.
104. Id.
105. Its sister ship Minsk, built in the same dock and launched in 1975,
was expected to begin sea trials in June 1976. Manthorpe, The Soviet Navy
in 1975, U.S. NAVAL INST. PRoc., May 1976, at 205; Address by Admiral Holloway, supra note 86. Construction is already well along at Nikolayev on
a third ship of this class. Id. To avoid confusion, this class, technically
called the Kuril-class, will be referred to throughout this Comment as the
Kiev-class.
Western analysts appear to be in agreement that the Kiev is but
the first of a series of Soviet "aircraft carriers." ...
It appears likely that the yard at Nikolayev could produce a
Kiev-class carrier on a regular basis at perhaps three- or fouryear intervals. The Zhdanov or Baltic shipyard at Leningrad also
could build carriers at the same rate if proper priorities were
made. Reports persist that the Soviets plan to build six or eight of
the Kiev-class carriers, a program that could permit one ship to be
continuously deployed in the Indian Ocean and one in the Mediterranean. With a shipyard in Leningrad as well as that at Nikolayev
building the ships, the Soviets could conceivably have as many as
four carriers at sea by the early 1980's.
Polmar, "Aircraft Carrier," supra note 85, at 160. Indeed, reports indicate
that four such ships are currently under construction, at least one of which
is being built in the Leningrad region.

Compare Av.

WEEK

& SPACE TECH,,

Aug. 9, 1976, at 26, with Washington Post, July 19, 1976, § A, at 16, col. 1.
"The arrival of these ships has been heralded by Admiral Gorshkov's support for embarked tactical air as a necessity for navies employed in extending political influence far abroad, and by a softening of previous Soviet
criticisms of this class of ship." JANE's FiGHTMG SHPS 1976-77, at 688 (J.
Moore ed. 1976).
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cantly from the Moskva-class design and indicate an unequivocal
commitment to aircraft launching and landing as a primary function. It would be economically wasteful and politically unrealistic
to build such a large warship without intending to utilize its full
capabilities.' 06 Without its aircraft, the Kiev is little better than
a 6,000-ton guided missile cruiser. With helicopters only, it slightly
exceeds the capabilities of the 15,000-ton Moskva. Only as an operating platform for VSTOL fixed-wing aircraft can the 40,000-ton
Kiev's great expense be justified. Pleading a primary antisubmarine mission is really irrelevant to the question of whether the
Kiev is an aircraft carrier, for the drafters of the Montreux
Convention were less concerned about specific ship missions than
Witness the detailed weight limits and
about ship configurations:
10 7
adopted,
they
sizes
gun

Figure 5
On the basis of the opinions of knowledgeable observers and of
analysis of the Kiev's weapons and its design, there is no way to
avoid the conclusion that the Kiev was designed and constructed
106. Cf. Letter from Mr. Ugur Ziyal, First Secretary, Turkish Embassy,
supra note 84: "Ever since construction of the KIEV was undertaken at
the Soviet dockyards of Nikolayev, it was obvious that the vessel was not
meant to be confined to the Black Sea ......
107. See Montreux Convention, supra note 5, annex II.

primarily to carry and operate aircraft at sea, its other mission
capabilities notwithstanding. Indeed, the conclusion is inescapable
that the Kiev is an aircraft carrier within the meaning of the Montreux Convention.0 s
Does the Montreux Convention Prohibit Transit of Aircraft
Carriers?
One commentator has suggested that because the Convention
does not specifically bar transit of aircraft carriers, "they are
permitted within the constraints of the . .. articles which place
tonnage limits on [warships of] non-Black Sea Powers." 109
While the Convention permits free passage for certain categories
of warships, 110 it effectively prohibits transit of all warships
exceeding 10,000 tons,"' except for capital ships of Black Sea
powers."12 Capital ships, as defined in Annex II, are surface
vessels of war belonging to either of the following subcategories:
(a) Surface vessels of war, other than aircraft-carriers,auxiliary vessels, or capital ships of subcategory (b), the standard
displacement of which exceeds 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) or
which carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 in. (203 mm.);
(b) Surface vessels of war, other than aircraft-carriers,the
standard displacement of which does not esceed [sic] 8,000 tons
(8,128 metric tons) and which carry a gun with a calibre exceeding
8 in. (203 mm.) "13
These words clearly exclude aircraft carriers from the category of
capital ships. Did the drafters also intend to exclude aircraft
carriers from the other categories of ships allowed free transit,
thereby completely barring their passage through the Straits?
108. Although the British government refrained from lodging a formal
objection to the Kiev's transit, Mr. Hattersby, its Minister of State for the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office in the House of Commons, stated:
The "Kiev" does not fit neatly into any of the classes of ships defined by the Convention. There is little doubt, however, that it
meets the definition of aircraft carriers annexed to the Convention,
which refers to ships designed or adapted primarily for the purpose
of carrying and operating aircraft at sea.
916 PARL.DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 7-8 (July 26, 1976).
109. Lewis, Point Paper: The Montreaux [sic] Convention and Soviet
Aircraft Carriers, July 30, 1974, at 2 (on file in the office of the San Diego
Law Review).
110. Montreux Convention, supra note 5, art. 10. See notes 52-54 supra.
111. Compare Montreux Convention, supra note 5, art. 14, with id. annex
II, pt. B (3).
112. Id. art. 11. See text accompanying notes 51-63 supra.
113. Montreux Convention, supra note 5, annex II, pt. B (1) (emphasis
added).
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Other language in the Convention and its Annexes may supply
the answer. Article 15, which states, "Vessels of war in transit
through the Straits shall in no circumstances make use of any aircraft which they may be carrying,"' 1 4 implies that the drafters
intended to allow at least some ships carrying aircraft to transit
the Straits. Consistent with this view is the language of Annex
II:

The fitting of a landing-on or flying-off deck on any vessel of war,
provided such vessel has not been designed or adapted primarily
for the purpose of carrying and operating aircraft at sea, shall not

cause any vessel so fitted to be classified in the category of aircraftcarriers.115

From these two provisions one may reasonably conclude that the
Convention's drafters intended not to prohibit transit of those warships which may have been designed or modified to carry a small
number of aircraft for missions incidental to the ship's primary
function. A provision restricting auxiliary vessels to no more than
two aircraft-launching apparatuses further supports this conclusion. 116
While Annex II expressly excludes aircraft carriers from the
categories of capital ships and light surface vessels," 7 it excludes
them by implication from the categories of submarines and minor
war vessels.'"' Auxiliary vessels, however, apparently may be
designed or adapted to carry aircraft, but not to operate them at
sea. 119 Annex II also distinguishes between two subcategories
of aircraft carriers:
(a) Vessels fitted with a flight deck, from which aircraft can
take off, or on which aircraft can land from the air;
(b) Vessels not fitted with a flight deck as described in (a)
above.120

114. Id. art. 15. The French Official Text reads: "Les btiments de
guerre en transit dans les D~troits ne pourront, en aucun cas, utiliser les

aronefs dont ils seraient porteurs."
115. Id. annex II pt. B (2). For French Official Text, see note 81 supra.
116. Montreux Convention, supra note 5, annex II, pt. B (6) (g).
117. See id. pts. B(1), B(3).
118. See id. pts. B(4), B(5).
119. See id. pt. B(6) (f).
120. Id. pt. B (2) (a) - (b). Aircraft carriers without flight decks, although
extinct today, figured prominently in the early history of Russian naval aviation. During World War I, two large cargo liners and several smaller merchant vessels were converted to seaplane carriers. The larger "hydro

Comparing auxiliary vessels with subcategory (b) aircraft carriers
emphasizes the drafters' intention to focus on the operation rather
than on the transportation of aircraft. Hence, vessels configured
primarily to carry and operate aircraft at sea, whether or not fitted
with flight decks, are excluded, while auxiliary vessels designed primarily to carry aircraft, but not to operate them at sea, may transit
freely.
A comparison between the repeated references to aircraft carriers
in Annex II and the absence of any affirmative provision for their
transit in the Convention's text-in contrast to the express inclusion of aircraft carriers in the Lausanne text-strongly suggests
that the parties considered the question of aircraft carriers and that
they consciously chose to exclude them from among those classes
of warships to which they desired to accord free transit of the
Straits.
The Convention represents a compromise of the extreme positions
of the parties. 121 Because it imposes limitations on transit
unknown under the Lausanne regime upon Black Sea and non-Black
Sea powers alike, 1 22 it is reasonable to conclude that both Black
Sea and non-Black Sea powers had to make certain concessions.
While the Soviet Union desired unlimited transit rights through the
Straits for its own warships, it was eager to prevent all foreign
warships, particularly aircraft carriers, from entering the Black
Sea. 23 The United States, Britain, France, and Japan had large
carrier fleets.12 4 But in 1936, the Soviet Union had no aircraft
carriers and no immediate plans to build any. 2 5 Under these
conditions, a "concession" denying transit to aircraft carriers of
Black Sea powers in return for a like concession from non-Black
Sea powers seems a small price to pay for a great benefit. Thus,
both the wording of the Convention and the practicalities of the
[plane] cruisers" carried up to eight Curtiss flying boats each and saw action in both the Baltic and the Black Sea.
Unlike some of their contemporaries in the Royal Navy, none of
the Russian ships had flight decks from which seaplanes could "roll
off" with the aid of trolley wheels. Rather, the Russian seaplanes
were hoisted over the side of the ship and made a takeoff from
the water. "Landings" were also made on the water, with the aircraft being hoisted aboard by crane.
Polmar, "Aircraft Carrier," supra note 85, at 147. See generally Layman
& Drashpil, Early Russian Shipboard Aviation, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC.,
Apr. 1971, at 56.
121. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
122. Note, supra note 42, at 188.
123. See authorities cited notes 49 & 50 supra.
124. See Polmar, "Aircraft Carrier,"supra note 85, at 147.
125. See id. at 147-48.
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Soviet bargaining position strongly support the view that the Mon26
treux Convention prohibits transit of aircraft carriers.
THE FUTURE OF THE MONTREUX CONVENTION

If logical analysis indicates that the Kiev's transit breached the
Montreux Convention, how does this comport with the uniform

views of the signatories that the Convention was not violated?
Does the Convention prescribe a logical or a political standard of
measurement?

Can the words "designed.

.

. primarily for the pur-

pose of carrying and operating aircraft at sea" mean one thing logically and another politically? Or do they have only one commonsense meaning-a meaning which establishes a standard that must
be enforced if the Montreux Convention is to have any continuing
validity? How far can the meanings of such words be stretched
until they no longer encompass their original concepts? A respected authority on treaty interpretation has observed:
The first rule of hermeneutics, legal or otherwise, is that interpretation means finding in good faith that meaning of certain words,
if they are doubtful, which those who used the words must have
desired to convey, according to the usage of speech . . . , the existing laws, common sense, and the general intent of that whole of
what
which the doubted passage forms a part; and does not mean
ingenuity may apparently succeed in forcing into a passage. 2 7

Turkey's willingness or its reluctance to frustrate Soviet ingenuity
by adhering to such a commonsense standard of interpretation in
administering the Straits will largely determine the future of the
Montreux Convention.
De Facto Versus De Jure Violation
The Kiev's transit constituted a de facto rather than a de jure
violation of the Montreux Convention. 28 As a matter of labels,
the Convention was not violated; in reality, it was. Such a
126. Consistent with this interpretation, in 1939 the Soviet Union reportedly laid the keel for its first aiicraft carrier at Leningrad, rather than in a
Black Sea shipyard. Id. at 149.
127. Barron v. United States, 2 MS. Op. 63 (1871) (Lieber, Umpire),

quoted in 3 J.B. MoORE, HISTORY

TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS

AND DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS
BEEN A PARTY 2522 (1898).

128. Cf. Bilsel, International Law, supra note 18, at 550, citing the divergence between the Straits regime and state practice prior to the signing
of the Lausanne Treaty.

dichotomy between practice and reality in enforcing Convention
provisions could lead to further flaunting of the Convention's provisions and to a general weakening of the Straits regime.
Turkey accepted the Soviet designation of antisubmarine cruiser
without objection from the other signatories even though many
12
Western officials and observers believed a breach had occurred.
With additional Kiev-class carriers being built in the Black Sea,
notice of transit for other "antisubmarine cruisers" will be forthcoming. Turkey must then decide whether to reassess the Kievclass cruisers in light of further observation-considering particularly their design and the fighter aircraft they carry-and deny
them further transit or to ignore the clear language of the
Convention and bow to Soviet verbal mastery and "naked-power
politics."'13 0 The Turkish desire to preserve the Convention' 3 '
1 2
while maintaining a low profile between the super powers
favors granting passage to Kiev-class vessels. However, the language of the Convention suggests that an "interpretation" allowing
such transit would constitute an ultra vires exercise of discretion. 33 The choices confronting Turkey appear equally unappealing. Permitting the Kiev to transit offends the Convention's language; denying transit risks Soviet denunciation of the Convention.
Either result would further weaken the present Straits Regime.
Soviet Expansionismin the Mediterranean
Russia and the Soviet Union have always coveted the Turkish
Straits. Tsar Alexander I complained that the Turk held the keys
129. Buzan, The Status and Future of the Montreux Convention, 17 Sun242, 246 (1976); see authorities cited note 79 supra.
130. VA L, STRAITS, supra note 10, at 138.
131. See Letter from Mr. Ugur Ziyal, First Secretary, Turkish Embassy,
supra note 84:
[T]he fundamental principles of the Montreux Convention. .. are
to preserve, in the Black Sea, the security of Turkey and the riparian Black Sea countries as well as securing passage in transit
as foreseen in the ...Convention.
The Convention still retains its characteristic of being the best
instrument for the realization of these principles, while maintaining
at the same time an ideal order between them.
132. Buzan, supra note 129, at 246.
133. Article 24 transfers the functions of the International Commission
under the Lausanne Treaty to the Turkish government, providing that it
"will supervise the execution of all the provisions of the present Convention
relating to the passage of vessels of war through the Straits." Articles 8
through 18 spell out in detail the rights of transit in peacetime. Article
19 specifies rights of transit in time of war, if Turkey is not a belligerent.
Only in Articles 20 (time of war, Turkey being a belligerent) and 21 (imminent danger of war) does the Convention accord the Turkish government
discretion to decide which warships will pass.
vivAL
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to his house. He expressed the classic Russian position when he
declared to Napoleon's ambassador: "Geography wills that I have
[Constantinople], because if it goes to another I would no longer
be master of my house ....
[I]t is indispensable that I possess
13 4
me.'
assigns
geography
what
During World War I, Russia nearly gained its objective by agreeing with Britain, France, and Italy to Russia's annexation of the
Turkish Straits, only to lose them when the revolution forced
Russia's withdrawal from the war. 135 Both at Lausanne and Montreux the new Soviet government endeavored to bar foreign warships from the Black Sea while attempting to gain unlimited transit
rights for its own fleet. 136 Stalin, complaining "Turkey's hand
holds our throat," tried after World War II to gain Soviet bases
in the Straits and joint control, with other Black Sea powers, over
13
the regime of the Straits. 7
These vital Straits have become even more important with the
dramatic rise of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet since 1963 and the
expansion of Soviet political influence in the Middle East. 38 The
recent loss of Soviet air bases in Egypt, leaving the Mediterranean
fleet without air cover, highlights the Soviet government's need to
assure passage of aircraft-carrying vessels through the Turkish
Straits. 3 9 Under the Montreux Convention such assurance is
134. V. PuREYEAR,

NAPOLEON AND THE DARDANELLES

326 (1951).

135. VALr, STRAnTs, supra note 10, at 28-29.
136. See authorities cited note 49 supra. In 1935, Ambassador Skinner
wrote to the Secretary of State:
The Russians, after all, do not change. In the days of the Tsar
their eyes were constantly fixed upon Constantinople. The new
Tsar, Stalin works in a different way. He makes a military alliance with Tjurkey; he becomes indispensable to Turkey

. .

.; he en-

courages the fortification of the Straits; he endows Turkey with
certain industries; he obtains a privileged position, generally, in
this country. How far will this movement proceed, and what
would happen if the strong and able leader of Turkey today should
disappear as some time he must, leaving the Government in the
hands of men of untested ability ... ? In such circumstances
would not Russia command the situation?
Letter from the Ambassador in Turkey to the Secretary of State (May 29,
1935), reprinted in [1935] 1 FORIGN REL. U.S. 1029, 1030 (1953).
137. VALi, supra note 38, at 182; VXLI, STRAITS, supra note 10, at 231.
See also authorities cited note 77 supra.
138. VAki, STRAITS, supra note 10, at 113-29.
139. See Washington Post, July 19, 1976, § A, at 16, col. 1. On Soviet
difficulties in obtaining military facilities in the Mediterranean, see VALI,

shaky at best. Thus, the Soviet Union will probably attempt by
direct or indirect means, to secure a more certain right of transit,
particularly for its Kiev-class ships. "[A ] s long as Soviet leaders,
like the Tsars before them, continue to want to reach out in force
into the Mediterranean and the other warm seas beyond, the lifeline for such endeavors, the Straits, will remain a prize to be
captured.'

1 40

Options to Revise the Convention

Feneric Vli in his insightful work, The Turkish Straits and
NATO, reviews the options available for altering the Regime of the
14 1
Turkish Straits: amendment, denunciation, and use of force.
His approach from the Soviet viewpoint reflects his perception of
the Soviet government as the one most desirous of altering the
Convention's terms.
Options for Peaceful Change
The two options for peaceful change that V~li identifies-amendment and denunciation-arise from the terms of the Convention.142 Because of its cumbersome time restraints and the
requirement of a unanimous vote,14 3 the Soviet Union would probably avoid the amendment procedure. However, a denunciation
supra note 10, at 114-15. But see Polmar, Aircraft Carrier,supra
note 89, at 138, who notes that the Kiev, which could overcome the Soviet
Navy's historic shortage of overseas airbases, appears when the number of
bases available to the Soviet Union is increasing, "and now apparently includes runways in Cuba, Guinea, Iraq, South Yemen, and Somalia, and possibly Angola, Libya, and Syria as well."
140. Vkff, STRAITs, supra note 10, at 163. For an analysis of current Soviet naval strategy, see Ra'anan, The Soviet View of Navies in Peacetime,
STRAITS,

NAVAL WAR C. REv., summer 1976, at 30. For a Soviet view of current naval

warfare tactics compatible with the development of seaborne aircraft

launching platforms, see Gorshkov, The Development of the Art of Naval
Warfare, U.S. NAVAL INST. Poc., June 1975, at 54, reprinted from MoRsKoY
sBOR=nI, Dec. 1974. See also Gorshkov, Navies in War and Peace (pt. 11),
U.S. NAVAL INST. PRoc., Nov. 1974, at 54; Turner, Commentary, id. at 67;
Statement of Rear Admiral Harvey, supra note 93, at 3-8.
141. VA i, STRAITs, supra note 10, at 136-63. For a thorough analysis of
Soviet respect for treaties and other forms of international law, see J.
TRmISA & R. SLussEm, THE THEORY, LAw, mm PoLicY OF SOVIET TREATIES
(1962); Triska & Slusser, Treaties and Other Sources of Order in International Relations: The Soviet View, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 699 (1958). See also
Esgain, Position of the United States and the Soviet Union on Treaty Law
and Treaty Negotiations, 46 MviL. L. REV. 31 (1969). Analysis of VAli's
proposed options is suggested in Knight, The Kiev and the Turkish Straits,
71 AM. J. INT'L L. 125, 129 (1977).
142. Montreux Convention, supra note 5, art. 28, paras. 3 & 4 (denunciation); id. art. 29 (amendment).
143. See ViLi, STRAITS, supra note 10, at 140.
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may be made at any time and would result in a general conference
to revise or replace the Montreux Convention. 44 Although such
a conference probably would not alter the perpetual principle of
freedom of navigation and transit by sea through the Straits, it
could nonetheless change the application of that principle by either
expanding or contracting the transit rights of warships. With the
exception of Japan, 1' 5 parties to this conference would probably
include the Montreux signatories, most Mediterranean nations, and
the United States.
Most important among the issues this conference should address
are whether to continue to govern the Straits regime by an international convention, whether to depart from the balance of interests struck at Montreux, and whether to update the Convention
technologically to provide for new ship-types and weapon systems,
14 6
such as missile-launchers, nuclear warheads, and helicopters.
While Soviet interests lie in dealing with Turkey individually and
47
in securing more favorable transit rights for Soviet warships,
Western interests lie in maintaining the status quo. However, all
nations could conceivably profit from the certainty that a techno14
logically updated convention would afford.
Vili suggests that although it seems desirable to maintain the
general prohibition on the passage of submarines, "concessions
may be made to the Russians in regard to aircraft carriers .... ,,149
Barring such outright concessions in the terms of the treaty,
the Soviets could nevertheless achieve a practical concession for
its Kiev-class vessels by insisting on a modern warship-classification scheme which would include these ships in the definition of
a class of vessels eligible to transit the Straits. More probably,
144. Id. at 139. But compare id. at 139-40, with Montreux Convention,
supra note 5, art. 28, para. 4, and id. art. 29, para. 4.
145. Japan has been excluded by the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1950.
VAu, STRArts, supra note 10, at 139.

146. For a discussion of these and other issues, see id. at 144-46.
147. See id. at 144 n.d.
148. In 1968, the Soviet Union protested the passage of two American destroyers on the grounds that the destroyers' antisubmarine rocket-launchers constituted guns larger than eight inches under the Convention. Id. at
102-04. Technologically updating the Convention would avoid such problems.
149. Id. at 145. For criticism of this position, see text accompanying
notes 161-65 infra.

however, neither side would gain significant concessions, and the
conference would deadlock.
Should this conference fail to agree on a new regime, several
results could follow. Turkey may contend that the regime of the
Straits for the denouncing parties reverts to the "ancient rule of
the Ottoman empire," which was replaced by both the Lausanne
Treaty and the Montreux Convention only with Turkish consent.150 The weakness of this argument lies in its failure to
account for the development of customary international law. Fifty
years of universally accepted free transit and navigation of the
Straits, albeit with certain numerical restrictions placed on warships, probably is sufficient to establish a customary law of the
Straits parallel to, but independent of, the Lausanne and Montreux
agreements. 151 For this reason, Turkey would probably continue
to apply the Montreux Convention to the warships of the denouncing parties, just as it now does to non-signatories. 15 2 Soviet compliance with the Lausanne regime despite its failure to ratify the
Lausanne Treaty' 58 provides some precedent for this view. Yet,
a denunciation culminating in precisely the same result that obtained before the denunciation seems little more than an exercise
in futility. Nothing could be gained by it.
The Soviet Union, in VAli's view, is likely to claim that upon its
denunciation the convention would lapse for all parties and that
the Straits would then be open on the same basis as are all other
international straits. 5
But the strong United States and NATO
resistance which he suggests to a change in this direction may not
be necessary, for the disadvantage to the Soviets of this course of
action is patent. Soviet warships may gain an unlimited right of
free transit, but at the same time foreign warships could enter the
Black Sea without limit. Surely no serious Soviet proposal would
condone such an intrusion. 55 An additional impediment arises
from the fact that the Turkish Straits have always enjoyed a special
regime; hence the Soviet position would contravene customary
international law.156
150. VAix, ST.ITS, supra note 10, at 141.
151. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
152. Compare VALi, STAITS, supra note 10, at 141 n.c., with Telegram

from the Charg6 in Turkey to the Secretary of State (June 26, 1936),

reprinted in [1936] 3 FOmUGN REL. U.S. 523 (1953).
153. See, e.g., VAL, STRAITS, supranote 10, at 35.
154. Id. at 142.
155. See authorities cited note 49 supra and text accompanying note 136
supra.
156. See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.

[VOL. 14: 681, 19771

Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

A comparison of Soviet options for peaceful change of the Straits
Regime points to the conclusion that the only potentially fruitful
course is that of denunciation followed by agreement on a new
regime. Yet it is doubtful that even this course would yield any
net gain, for the Western powers, and particularly the United States,
are unlikely to bargain away any advantage the Montreux Convention now affords them. 157 Agreement in the face of diametrically
opposed positions means compromise, but striking a compromise on
a regime more favorable to either side than is the present one is
doubtful at best. Therefore, the Soviets will probably resort to
some other means to effect a change of the Straits Regime.
Use of Force
The other alternative Vli proposes is the use of force of
varying degrees short of war. 158 For example, the Soviets may
attempt to gain more favorable treatment with regard to the Straits
by persuading influential Turks that NATO is neither much interested in nor willing to defend Turkey and that the nation could
only benefit by abandoning NATO in favor of an alliance with the
Soviet Union. 159 Whatever the nature of the Soviet campaign,
it is likely to include the use of psychological force and deception.
In this regard Vdli makes an important observation: Moscow is
more likely to proceed step-by-step toward its desired goal than
to use a sudden, ultimatum-like thrust.6 0 The difficulty in identifying such gradual efforts in time to oppose them is further com157. It is hoped that future negotiators will have learned from the naive
American approach at Yalta and Potsdam which largely ignored the intricate legal-political balance established by the draftsmen of Montreux. The
American note of November 2, 1945, accepted the Soviet proposals for unrestricted passage of its own warships through the Straits and for denial
of the right of transit to warships of non-Black Sea powers. At Potsdam,
a State Department briefing paper even recommended that the United
States not object to the establishment of Russian bases in the Straits, if
done "with the free consent of Turkey." VkLI, STRAITS, supra note 10,
at 143, 244-46.
158. Id. at 146.
159. State Department officials are concerned that the Turkish-Soviet
"declaration of political principles," soon to be signed, may represent a "further erosion in Turkey's already tenuous association with [NATO]." L.A.
Times, Nov. 13, 1976, pt. I, at 6, col. 1.
160. VLT, STRAITS, supra note 10, at 146. For recommended steps to oppose Soviet efforts, see id. at 147-51. For an example of Stalin's step-bystep approach to the Straits, see note 136 supra.

pounded by the veil of secrecy surrounding the Soviet decisionmaking process.
Thus, the course most likely for the Soviets to pursue in effecting a change in the Straits regime is a step-by-step process of
reorienting Turkey toward the East. Because such a process must
be long term, certain short-term measures aimed at more limited
goals are probable. One such goal could be to find a way to gain
transit through the Straits for aircraft carriers built in the ice-free
Black Sea shipyards.
While VAii makes a penetrating analysis of the issues at stake
in revising the Convention, his analysis falters with respect to aircraft carriers, for he fails to perceive the significance of the stepby-step process in securing passage for Soviet aircraft carriers built
in the Black Sea. First, he implies erroneously that aircraft carriers
of 10,000 tons or less may transit the Straits, presumably as light
surface vessels; then he mentions a 15,000-ton limitation on Soviet carriers-positions which are not only contradictory but also
wholly unwarranted by the wording of Annex II.161 Furthermore, while he stresses the urgency of containing Soviet political
expansion in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, 162 he singles
out transit of Soviet aircraft carriers as one of those items the West
should consider giving up in any future revision of the Montreux
Convention.1 3 This unfortunate remark must stem either from
the belief that the Soviet Union had no aircraft carriers and was
unlikely to build any,164 from a conviction that any subsequent
Soviet aircraft carriers would follow the same design as Moskva and
Leningrad,6 5 or from a total misconception of the importance of
aircraft carriers in modern naval warfare as instruments of military
and political power projection. Whatever Vili's reasons, analysis
of the factors surrounding the Kiev's construction points strongly
in the direction of a well-planned effort to skirt the prohibition
of the Montreux Convention.
The Kiev as a Step in Avoidance of the Montreux Convention
The 40,000-ton Kiev was built in the Black Sea. To build a
40,000-ton ship specifically designed to carry and operate aircraft
161. Compare Vki, STRAITrs, supra note 10, at 46-47 n.h. & 145, with
note 52 supra and text accompanying notes 110-13 supra.
162. E.g., VALi, STRAITs, supra note 10, at 146-63.
163. Id. at 145.
164. VA l appears to be unaware of the Kiev, the first news reports of
which were released in January 1972, the same year The Turkish Straits
and NATO was published.
165. Implied in VAu, STRArTs, supra note 10, at 46-47 n.h.
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at sea and to perform a primary mission of antisubmarine warfare,
then to restrict its operating zone to the Black Sea, into which the
Montreux -Convention prohibits entry of foreign submarines, would
be the height of waste and folly. To build additional, identicallyconfigured ships in the Black Sea shipyards would be utter madness
-unless some way could be found to transport this fleet of large,
aircraft-carrying, antisubmarine warships to bases outside the
Black Sea.
But in order to exit the Black Sea, these ships must pass through
the Turkish Straits, and the Montreux Convention restricts transit
of ships larger than 15,000 tons to capital ships-that is, to battleships and cruisers-of Black Sea powers. For Soviet strategists, the
solution must have been simple: Build a hybrid ship which has
some of the characteristics of a capital ship but which can also carry
and operate aircraft; then name it according to its surface warfare
role and downplay its aircraft operating capability.
The ultimate model could be preceded by an intermediate design
which could be useful in two respects: to prepare the way for
acceptance of the ultimate design both at home and abroad and
to operate as a test case by transiting the Turkish Straits. If no
one objected to the transit, the way would be cleared for the
advanced design. If objections were raised, a costly and probably
futile construction effort could be avoided or shifted to a shipyard
outside the Black Sea. It is significant in this regard that the
Moskva and the Leningrad, two 15,000-ton, helicopter-carrying
"antisubmarine cruisers," preceded the Kiev by four to five years. 16
Soviet planners were no doubt encouraged when both ships passed
through the Straits virtually without protest.
In January 1972, the Kiev's construction was reported in the
Western press. The report was based upon a satellite photograph
of a huge ship being built at the same shipyard which produced the
Moskva and Leningrad. The concurrence of this construction with
the abrupt end of the Moskva-class of antisubmarine cruisers suggests a plan to pave the way for calling an aircraft carrier a
cruiser by first successfully designating a helicopter-carrier as a
cruiser. These actions appear to be a part of a conscious, well166. The Moskva was launched in 1967; the Leningrad, in 1968. See text
accompanying notes 101-05 supra.

planned effort to launch a fleet of aircraft carriers and send them
through the Turkish Straits as cruisers.
American NationalSecurity Interests in the Straits

The essence of the American interest in the Turkish Straits lies
in its policy of containment. Napoleon perceived the supreme
strategic value of the Straits for this purpose when he declared
his willingness "to abandon mastery over half the world rather than
yield Russia those narrow straits." 1607 He saw that Russian
control of the Straits would threaten the security of his empire.
The United States, with its powerful navy and its strong ties to
Western Europe, has established itself as the dominant Western
naval power in the Mediterranean and has committed its resources
to the defense of Western Europe. In order to adequately protect
Western Europe, the defense of its northern and southern flanks
must be assured. 168 The presence of the American Sixth Fleet
in the Mediterranean strengthens the security of the southern
flank. But that fleet is now being challenged by the newer, more
numerous Soviet fleet. 6 9 The free entry of Soviet aircraft
carriers into the Mediterranean would not only facilitate Soviet
expansionism there but also alter the balance of power in the
Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean. 170 Thus,
167. Quoted in VALI,

STRAiTs,

supra note 10, at ix.

168. Id. at 151. Concerning the defense of Europe's southern flank, see

Johnston, NATO's Southern Region: Problems and Prospects, U.S. NAVAL
INST. PROC., Jan. 1975, at 47.
169. When the Kiev joined the Soviet Mediterranean squadron in July
1976, that squadron, which is drawn from the Black Sea Fleet, numbered
56 surface ships and an estimated 10 to 12 submarines. At the same time
the United States Sixth Fleet numbered only 43 ships plus submarines.
N.Y. Times, July 22, 1976, at 5, col. 1. The Soviet naval buildup appears to be motivated by Moscow's desire to gain the "ability to cut vital
Western sea lanes in case of war-and to cure its past inability to use military power in time of peace to support political objectives far beyond Russia's own borders. L.A. Times, July 27, 1976, pt. II, at 6, cols. 1 & 2. But
see L.A. Times Nov. 11, 1976, pt. I-A, at 1, col. 1, suggesting that the lack
of home port facilities for the Soviet fleet prevents it from posing a serious
threat to NATO forces in the Mediterranean.
Rear Admiral Harvey, Director of Naval Intelligence, explains why total
numbers of ships are not conclusive in judging the naval balance:
We and our allies must depend on ocean commerce for our economic as well as our military survival. The Soviets are essentially a continental power and though they are increasingly exploiting the benefits of the sea, those benefits are not vital to their
continued existence. [T]he U.S. Navy must be prepared to control those sea areas required to fulfil our objectives while the
Soviets need only be prepared to deny us this use of the sea.
Statement, supra note 93, at 2. See also note 96 supra.
170. The Kiev, unlike the American supercarriers, enjoys rapid access to
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as long as the United States maintains its interest in Western
Europe, the defense of the Mediterranean, including Turkey and
the Turkish Straits, must be paramount in Washington's geostrategic approach. 171 So long as Turkey and its all-important
Straits stand in line with the defense of the Western world, containment of Soviet advances is a possibility. Should these vital Straits
be lost, both NATO's and the United States' position in the
172
Mediterranean would be seriously jeopardized.
CONCLUSION

The Turkish Straits, by virtue of their geographic position, form
a strategic choke point for both entry into and egress from the
Black Sea. Throughout their history, these important Straits have
enjoyed both special treatment under international law and special
attention from Turkey's neighbors, particularly Russia and the
Soviet Union. Since 1936, the Montreux Convention has governed
transit of the Straits.
Analysis of the Convention indicates that its drafters intended
to prohibit transit of all aircraft carriers through the Straits. Logical analysis also shows that the Soviet "antisubmarine cruiser" Kiev
the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean because it is small enough to transit
the Suez Canal. Prina, supra note 79, at 11. The long closure of the Suez
Canal actually benefitted the West by preventing Soviet expansion into the
Indian Ocean. See VALI, STmTS, supra note 10, at 159. Concerning the
importance of the Suez Canal in Soviet strategic thinking, see Slonim, Suez
and the Soviets, U.S. NAVAL INsT. PRoc., Apr. 1975, at 36.
Secretary of State Kissinger voiced his concern over such changes in the
balance of power: "In the nuclear age, once a change in geopolitical balance
has become unambiguous, it is too late to do anything about it. However
great our strength, it will prove empty if we do not resist seemingly marginal changes whose cumulative impact can undermine our security." Address by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, International Institute for
Strategic Studies, in London (July 26, 1976), reprinted in 74 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 105 (1976).
171. VALI, STRAITS, supra note 10, at 152.
Our longstanding relationship with Turkey is not simply a favor
to Turkey; it is a clear and essential mutual interest. Turkey lies
on the rim of the Soviet Union and at the gates of the Middle East.
It is vital to the security of the eastern Mediterranean, the southern flank of Western Europe, and the collective security of the
Western alliance. Our U.S. military bases in Turkey are as critical
to our own security as they are to the defense of NATO.
Address by President Gerald Ford before a Joint Session of Congress (Apr.
10, 1975), reprinted in 72 DEP'T STATE BULL. 534 (1975).
172. VALi, STRAITs, supra note 10, at 162.

is an aircraft carrier as defined by Annex II to the Convention.
Yet, the Kiev succeeded in transiting the Turkish Straits without
protest from any of the Convention signatories.
The ease with which the Kiev steamed through the Turkish
Straits highlights the Montreux Convention's present inadequacies.
But other factors may also have contributed to the Kiev's success
-for example, Turkey's desire to placate its powerful eastern
neighbor. 178 Whatever the reasons for the Kiev's successful
transit, they are mostly political, not logical or legal.
Certainly the Convention needs revision, but because of potential
major disagreements among the prospective parties to any new
convention, revision appears fruitful only in the area of technological update. Yet even in this area one of the major parties stands
to lose. If new categories are adopted which do not allow Kievclass warships to pass through the Straits, the Soviets will have
lost a right they presently enjoy. Conversely, if Kiev-class vessels
are placed in a new category for which passage is permitted, the
West will have lost the advantage of the Convention's present
restrictions on transit of aircraft carriers. Because revision of the
Convention offers so little potential for gain, the Soviet Union will
probably attempt other means to achieve its goals with respect to
the Turkish Straits. Indeed, the Kiev itself appears to be an
example of one such effort to avoid the restrictions of the Montreux
Convention by appearing to comply with them.
Thus, on the question of Soviet aircraft carriers transiting the
Turkish Straits, the language of the Montreux Convention supports
one position while State practice supports an opposite position. The
two could be reconciled by revising the Convention, but revision
is fraught with pitfalls. So long as the major powers remain
diametrically opposed concerning the content of a future Straits
regime, the probabilities of failing to agree are high.
In the midst of this controversy, Turkey occupies an unenviable
position, for it holds the key to the Straits. Turkey's conscientious
and even-handed administration of the Straits regime largely
accounts for the Montreux Convention's continued vitality after
forty years. For the West to accuse Turkey of political favoritism
in its administration of the Straits regime not only would weaken
its ties with Turkey, but also would push Turkey further toward
173. See Prina, supra note 79, at 11; cf. Lewis, supra note 109: "The
Turks are not likely to interpret the Convention so harshly that they would
antagonize their most powerful neighbor by prohibiting the transit of that
neighbors [sic] newest and most powerful warship."
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the Soviet sphere of influence. Indeed, the West cannot realistically expect Turkey to ignore the political realities of Soviet
pressure. The pressures upon Turkey from the Soviets are enormous. The two countries share a common border; large Soviet
naval squadrons sail the seas which wash both of Turkey's coasts,
and since the days of Alexander I, Russians have coveted the
"Black Sea" Straits.
For the West, the Straits form a vital link in the chain forged
to contain Soviet expansion. If the Western allies desire to continue their policy of containment in order to protect Europe's
southern flank and to prevent Soviet expansion in the Middle East
and beyond, they must make unequivocal commitments to Turkeycommitments leaving no doubt that Turkey will enjoy strong military and economic support in opposing Soviet pressures.
The Montreux Convention is not yet a dead letter, but the Kiev's
transit has weakened it. 17 4 And political realities disfavor its early
revision. The defense of Turkey and the retention of control of
the Straits in the safe hands of their territorial sovereign are essential elements of Europe's defense, 175 for the West's best hope for
a fairly administered Straits regime lies with a strong and independent Turkey. That independence assured, the Turkish government may then become more favorably disposed toward reconsidering transit rights for Kiev-class vessels in light of both the wording
of the Convention and the discovered meaning of the label antisubmarine cruiser. The problem of Kiev and the Turkish Straits is
largely one of words and their meanings. And like the children's
story, in the end this problem resolves itself to a question of "which
is to be master-that's all."

F. DAVID FROmAN
174. See Pardo, Foreword, Law of the Sea IX, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 507,

508-09 (1977):
Mr. Froman convincingly demonstrates that the passage of the Kiev
has weakened the 1936 Montreux Convention and that continued
failure on the part of Turkey and the NATO powers to oppose evasion of its terms may deprive the Convention of all meaning, with
incalculable political and strategic consequences in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.
175. VALI, STRITS, supra note 10, at 151.

